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Abstract 
 
This paper is a radical rethinking of Public International Law through the use of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis.  Its central thesis is that while contemporary 
scholarship addresses what Lacan calls the Symbolic and Imaginary registers 
including law, politics, and ideology, it continues to ignore and repress the 
dimension of the Real. The paper illustrates this with a clinical example 
examined by Kris and discussed by Lacan. Imagining Public International Law as 
an indefatigable neurotic in search of ‘fresh brains’, the paper shows why 
meeting her in the domains of law and politics is not enough to satiate her 
appetite. What continues to resist is the ‘extimate’, the inhuman element within 
the human that the subject hides so well from herself that it is excluded in the 
interior. A major instance of the extimate is the ‘caffeinated neighbor’, that is, the 
neighbor who is not in our image because her disturbing core has not been 
subtracted. The paper argues that unless International Law comes to terms with 
this inevitably ugly and obscene core, in oneself as well as in the neighbor, it 
cannot hope to achieve any meaningful changes. That the need to recognize the 
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extimate is the ethical demand facing International Law now; unless we address 
it, our symptoms will continue to grow and we will continue to crave fresh 
brains.  
 
1. Identity Crisis? That Is So Last Century  
 
For insufficiently young academics like myself, the sudden embrace, adulation 
and self-congratulation amongst and for public international lawyers comes not only 
as a surprise, but calls to be treated with a grain of suspicion or at least the proverbial 
salt. To rewind: studying and teaching international law in the last century, not so 
long ago as that was, always came, as some of us recall, with a large dose of 
apologetics, restorative rhetoric and self-abnegating excuses: this law, lets call it 
provisionally our teachers pleaded, may or may not be law, it may or may not work, it 
may or may not achieve justice, or order, or even certainty. Please bear with this vast 
and often tedious array of treaty instruments, declarations and resolutions, they 
impliedly implored, learn them, interpret them, compare and fight with them, even if, 
in the final analysis, lets admit, they may be devoid of any material effect, indeed, lets 
face it, they may be meaningless. 
 Less than two decades later, International law, we are told, is experiencing a 
rebirth. From international criminal trials of former dictators at the Hague to a hive of 
resolutions at the United Nations and Human Rights tribunals, the discourse of 
International Law is indeed hard to escape. ‘From an exotic specialization on the 
fringes of the law school’ James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi begin their 
magisterial Companion to International Law, ‘International law has turned into a 
ubiquitous presence in global policy-making as well as in academic and journalistic 
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commentary’ 2 . Even supermodels have been robed under its spell, signaling its 
ultimate triumph and acceptance in a celebrity-driven culture. Yet before we rush to 
congratulate this perennially insecure subject with coming of age after centuries’ of 
diffidence and self-questioning, this article will take a step back and address what 
International Law, in all its contemporary glory, continues to resist and repress.  
Given this paper contests the notion of identity, of the human subject as well 
as of a discipline, including that of International Law, the only way to proceed is by 
addressing its subject awryly, that is, from an angle, lets say the oblique angle from 
which an analyst (avoids) looking at her patient on the couch. Public International 
Law will lie on the Lacanian couch with the help of a clinical case called the ‘fresh 
brains case’ from which all of us, and in particular academics, have a lot to learn. The 
case was examined by Ernst Kris in 1950s New York and discussed repeatedly by 
Lacan who waged a long vendetta against the teachings and practices of ego 
psychology generally and against its prophets, Ernst Kris, in particular.
3
 Kris’s patient 
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may remind us not only of all of us academics forever in search of new ‘knowledges’ 
but of Public International Law itself. The symptom these patients share, I suggest, is 
an assumption that someone somewhere out there is perfect, has all the answers, is, in 
short, full of ‘fresh brains’, and that someone is not oneself. In the case of Kris’s 
patient, as we will see, the constant craving for fresh brains was not just metaphorical 
but literal.  
 Kris’s patient, like our subject Public International Law, was too 
conscientious, always examining his own worth and credentials and ridden by doubts 
whether he came up to the standards expected and ordained by some invisible and 
perfect Big Other. Indeed he was plagued by not just normal, healthy insecurity that 
his work may not be good enough, but further an inhibition against publishing his 
work for fear that it was plagiarized from the work of other people. As we can all 
appreciate, an inhibition against publishing is not conducive to a successful academic 
career. So the patient resorted to analysis in part to overcome his inhibition. 
 My paper depicts Public International Law as the neurotic patient hankering 
after ‘fresh brains’ that she believes she will find in other disciplines, be they religion, 
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economics, history, politics, literature or, now, psychoanalysis
4
. Like Kris, I analyse 
this patient’s symptoms, but unlike Kris, and following Lacan, I point out how Kris’s 
diagnosis goes wrong, leading not to a cure but to repetitive acting out. A constant 
craving for fresh brains, I will argue, can lead to a diet that can be as beneficial as it 
can be noxious and dangerous: in other words, if we are what we eat, and we do not 
want to revolt, or throw up what we take in, we must be cautious about sampling the 
flavors of the month which can leave the underlying body, or law’s ego we could say, 
just as sick if not sicker than before our meal.  
In contrast to Kris who, as we will see, tries to cure his patient, the message 
from the (nasty) Lacanian analyst is not to cure the patient’s ego and return it to her 
well adjusted to reality, in other words, not to strengthen and perpetuate International 
Law’s self-delusions but to lead it, kicking and screaming no doubt, to finding out the 
bloody histories that constituted it as a subject and enable it, in short, to ‘get over 
itself’. In lacanese this is achieved when the patient traverses the fundamental fantasy 
that sustained it as a subject. It requires the annihilation of the fantasies and 
misrecognitions that the patient used to rely on, and the constitution of a new, perhaps 
less confident and arrogant, but also, as I will argue, a truer and more ethical subject. 
In the last section of my paper I call this the ‘atheist’ position: the subject, difficult 
as this step is, has to dethrone the Big Other from his paper throne, stop 
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addressing her complaints and demands to him, in short, stop recognizing him as 
well as letting go of her desire to be recognized by him. That ethical position can 
only be attained, quite simply, when the subject has come to terms with the fact 
that the Big Other (sometimes known as God) doesn’t exist. 
 
2. The Split Subject and the Split Other 
 
 An important step towards attaining this ethical position is for the subject to 
take responsibility for her own desires, and stop looking for other people or 
disciplines to tell her what to do, what to want, and how to be. Public International 
Law, I suggest, has been especially neurotic, indeed hysterical, in its constant appeals 
to other disciplines to help define its identity. To give a short diagnosis of this 
symptom, International Law, like any subject, like all of us, and like Kris’s patient, is 
marked by a lack at its center. Indeed the constitution of International Law, like the 
identity of any subject or discipline, is achieved by a cut; what psychoanalysts call 
castration. Once that cut has been inflicted the subject goes on endlessly looking to 
recover the missing bit, deluding herself that if only they had that bit they would be 
‘whole’. The problem with this quest is that the people or disciplines we look for to 
complete us, are just as lacking as we are
5
.  
Moreover, it is not just the subject that is irretrievably cut and castrated but, 
more importantly, the symbolic order. The message of psychoanalysis is not only that 
the subject is irretrievably lacking (that is hard enough to digest and come to terms 
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with) but that the Big Other she addresses her demands and pleas to is also pathetic 
and impotent. So when we hear, for instance, that, International Criminal Law aimed 
to ‘complete’ Human Rights law and render it ‘whole’ 6 , we must recall that 
International Law, like all subjects, like all of us, will always be lacking: something 
will always be missing because losing something, is a precondition for our 
constitution as subjects
7
. It is futile, therefore, to look for the missing bit in other 
people or in other disciplines. Moreover, such searches prevent us from admitting to 
and doing something about our own deficiencies: as Lacan puts it, ‘in persuading the 
other that he has that which may complement us, we assure ourselves of being able to 
continue to misunderstand precisely what we lack’8 . In particular it conveniently 
allows us to ignore and repress what is ugliest and most shameful about ourselves, 
that is, the extimate. 
 As I argue later, God was ideal for filling the gap in the subject, as well as in 
the Other of the symbolic order. Unfortunately, since God’s so-called death, modern 
man and woman have struggled in vain to fill the empty place with anything remotely 
as ‘fulfilling’. A major thread of my paper and indeed of my current work as a whole 
is a plea towards what I call an ‘atheist jurisprudence’: that is, an acknowledgement 
and coming to terms with the fact, as difficult as that is, that, ‘there is no Other of the 
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Other’. That, since there no ultimate guarantor for our acts or our laws, we need to 
learn to live without guarantees, in our personal lives just as in our disciplines
9
. 
 A pre-emptive response to a paradox in this paper: why look at psychoanalysis 
if the argument is to stop looking for others, subjects or disciplines, who will 
complete us? The short answer is that the lacanian couch, unlike most couches, and in 
particular unlike the ego psychology couch, from which I take the fresh brains 
example, far from boosting the patient’s ego, solidifying it and returning it to the 
patient ‘whole’ (which in practice means in the analyst’s own image), it delivers the 
patient in pieces: the goal of the analysis in effect is to devastate, de-subjectify and 
shutter the subject.  
And what is it that devastates and shutters the subject? In brief the analysis is 
over when the patient comes face to face with her own ‘extimate’ desires. That is the 
hardest thing to do and we spend our whole life avoiding it. After all the extimate is 
something that we are so thoroughly ashamed of, that we have made sure we hid it 
where no one, not even ourselves, would dare look: we have hidden and excluded it 
not outside but in the interior. A lacanian analyst is one who leads the patient, to 
commit murder against himself and also, soon after, against the analyst: once the 
analysis is over the analyst can be killed, with impunity.  And well might the patient 
murder him, as the analyst has just witnessed the patient’s unspeakable truth. 
 
3. Where There’s Two, There’s Always a Third 
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How do we approach this truth? In a recent inspired and passionate 
Conference at Melbourne’s pioneering Centre for International Law and the 
Humanities, the organizers’ call for papers suggested, incisively and accurately, that 
Public International Law dwells ‘in at least two registers’: on the one hand a 
technocratic or solemn tone speaks of the realm of authority and law, on the other, the 
realm of passions, affect and emotions
10
. We could depict these realms as the public 
versus the private, the male versus the female, even law versus literature. The hint, 
however, that there are ‘at least’ two registers, prompts me to look for the inevitable 
third, to examine the way the three registers are knit together and what is hidden, 
repressed or protected in the process. The third register, which continues to resist and 
insist, is what Lacan calls the Real, the contingent, unrepresentable and unassimilable.  
My paper uses the fresh brains case to illustrate why we must address all three and not 
just two registers. Imagining Public International Law as an indefatigable neurotic in 
search of new ideas, I discuss why meeting this patient in the domain of law, and in 
the domain of passions, will not be enough to satiate her appetite. Instead, like Kris’s 
patient, her symptoms will reappear, and grow, after every meal, like weeds.  
 Everyone knows that at the intersection between the Imaginary, Symbolic and 
Real registers we can find Lacan’s famous little object a, that obscure object of desire 
that constitutes the subject as subject and which was cut off from the subject for it to 
emerge into the symbolic order
11
. Another unruly inhabitant of planet Real in addition 
to the well known ‘little object a’ is the extimate: the alien, or inhuman element 
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within the human that the subject hides so well from herself that it is excluded in the 
interior. The extimate is the monster within us that cannot be represented and 
therefore cannot be assimilated in our psychic space.  
 The extimate is a term coined by Lacan who, as he protested all his life, was 
not Lacanian but orthodox Freudian. Can we find the term or an intimation of it in 
Freud? International lawyers like us would be delighted to find that, when Freud 
gestures towards this term in one of the metaphors that he was so adept at, the 
metaphor he chooses is from the domain of Public International Law: ‘Pathological 
phenomena’, he suggests, ‘are, one might say, a State within a State, an inaccessible 
party, with which co-operation is impossible, but which may succeed in overcoming 
what is known as the normal party and forcing it into its service’12.  
 Gerry Simpson has rightly and aptly described law as displaced politics while 
Martii Koskenniemi has written of the flight to legality as a flight against and away 
from politics
13
. Both are right. Both, however, ignore the third dimension, that of the 
Real and in particular of the extimate.  The flight from politics, unfortunately, is not 
the only problem: if only. Politics, as Freud knew, long before Slavoj Zizek, is also 
always a politics of fantasy: like religion, ‘the assumptions that determine our 
political regulations [are] illusions’14. So politics also and always dwell in the realm 
of fantasy, of the imaginary. The greater task is coming to terms with the fact that the 
politics we fly away from (into the supposedly safe haven of rules and regulations) 
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are also imaginary fantasies and mis-recognitions; and that we indulge in those 
fantasies in order to avoid the Real: the unassimilable extimate core.  
 In the case of Public International Law, just as in the case of domestic law, the 
retreat into law is a retreat into reality to avoid the Real; yes, most of us agree that law 
is a defense against politics but more fundamentally law is a defense against the 
unassimilable core, the extimate. Politics and law, therefore, are just two sides of a 
three-pronged problematic: law is on the side of the symbolic, politics on the side of 
the imaginary. But neither law nor politics can eliminate or protect us from the Real. 
In the final analysis, the flight from politics to law is a flight from the Real, and in 
particular and obviously the real of death: that which cannot be legislated away yet 
persists and insists with more force than any rule of law or imaginary politics.  In this 
paper I will not talk about the manifold intimations of the Real but one instance of it: 
the extimate and in particular the extimate as the Neighbor. Since the subject hides the 
extimate so well from herself, one instance when it appears is in the neighbor: not 
because the neighbor manifests the extimate core better, but precisely because the 
reason we turn away in horror at the neighbor is because we recognize that alien core 
in ourselves.  
 A further reason why we have to examine the third register: we know politics 
and the rhetorics surrounding it are fake, but what we also must come to terms with is 
that our deeply held affects and emotions, our passions, as the Melbourne Conference 
put it, are also fake; borrowed, second hand, cheap imitations of the desires of other 
people. As Fernando Pessoa puts it in a timeless metaphor, we are all ‘shadows of 
gestures performed by someone else’15 and it is ‘other people’s rubbish [that] pile up 
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in the rain in the inner courtyard that is [our] life’16. Or, as Rimbaud put it much 
earlier, in a phrase that Lacan never stopped repeating, ‘I is another’17. Unfortunately 
we can fool our ego into thinking we are forgiving, or we are loving or we are 
reconciled. But the only affect that is truly ours and is not borrowed or copied from 
the other is, sadly, anxiety. 
 Which leads me to the issue of how to get close to the extimate? In Law, War 
and Crime, Gerry Simpson charts the similarities between ‘show trials’ which are 
supposedly political and ‘war crime trials’ which are supposedly legal and in 
accordance with the rule of law. Simpson’s title for the chapter, ‘Law’s Anxieties’, 
intimates something that Freud knew; that anxiety is the only sure way to finding 
what Lacan later termed the extimate
18
. Anxiety, as Charles Shepherdson puts it, is 
‘the Ariadne’s thread’ leading us to the Real 19 . The all-too familiar panic that 
accompanies anxiety serves to warn us that we are approaching something precious, 
indeed unbearably precious: we are in other words, coming close to jouissance and, in 
the terms I focus on in this paper, to the extimate. 
 Anxiety therefore warns us of proximity to our unspeakable truth because, as 
Lacan knew, anxiety is the only affect that does not lie
20
. When we encounter law’s 
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anxiety we can be sure that we are getting close to law’s extimacy: something that is 
so close to law’s desire that law has hidden even from itself. In the example explored 
by Simpson, one could go further and say that war crime trials and show trials are 
uncanny doubles: when the fragile border we try to draw between law and politics, 
between show trials and war crime trials, is perilously close to collapsing and coming 
undone, we can be sure that we are close to looking through law’s own looking glass: 
that we are close to witnessing what we have been at pains not to see by hiding from 
ourselves, that is, the primary repression, the bit that had to be cut off from us at our 
inception in order to constitute us as subjects. Something primary, violent, bloody 
and, needless to say political, had to be cut off from war crime trials to constitute 
themselves as trials rather than show trials. But as Simpson shows, the seams show 
through, hence the onset of ‘anxiety’. 
 
4. In Search of Fresh Brains, Again 
 
Lets check what is happening with Kris’s patient, the academic hampered in 
his desire and need to publish by a fear that what he has to say is a plagiarism of 
existing work by other colleagues. During the course of the analysis he apparently 
manages to write a paper that he is almost happy with, only to find shortly afterwards 
a thesis in the library which, he claims, makes the same findings as his own paper and 
which, he claims, he must have plagiarized as the thesis in the library had been 
published some years ago and he himself had read the thesis in the past. In a paper 
discussing the case, Kris relates his patient’s ‘satisfaction and excitement’ at having 
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proved himself once more a plagiarist. Such behavior on the part of his patient led 
Kris to ‘inquire in very great detail about the text he was afraid to plagiarize. In a 
process of extended scrutiny it turned out that the old publication contained useful 
support of his thesis but no hint of the thesis itself.’21 
 How are we to interpret Kris’s intervention here? It appears that, in the good 
old tradition of ego psychology, Kris, tried to ‘cure’ his patient’s ego. To do that he 
entered his patient’s imaginary universe in more or less the following terms: ‘Very 
well’, we can imagine Kris saying, ‘you think you plagiarized, let us check, oh yes, I 
checked and you didn’t plagiarize.’ Having done that, Kris, equally ‘satisfied and 
excited’ to have found his patient is not a plagiarist, communicates his findings to the 
patient. The important point here is that the analyst has joined the patient on the 
dimension of the imaginary: Kris discussed with him (or perhaps even went to the 
library to check) the contents of the two papers in order to ascertain whether the 
patient’s work was indeed a plagiarism of a previous paper. Although it is not clear 
from Kris’s account or from Lacan’s retelling of it, whether Kris actually went to the 
library to check and compare the two theses, either way, Kris’s attempt to make a 
value judgment on the issue of plagiarism, does not impress Lacan.  
 Having done his patient’s homework on the scientific project his patient was 
working on, Kris proceeds to do his own homework as an analyst and offers his 
patient an interpretation of what has been happening: Kris’s theory is that his patient 
wanted to be a plagiarist because that would have proved to him that there were ideas 
worth stealing from someone greater. That someone greater than you, Kris suggests to 
his patient, was your grandfather, or more accurately the grand father, that is a father 
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who is so grand that his ideas were worth copying. In other words, Kris suggests to 
his patient that he is so convinced his grand father is ‘grand’, that he cannot possibly 
come up with anything, grand or petit, of his own. This leads Kris to conclude that the 
patient’s protest that he was a plagiarist was actually a defense against having to 
compete with his ‘grand’ father, that is, a father who is ‘great’. To cut a long story 
short, Kris here offered his patient a (not so) imaginative interpretation straight out of 
the good old story of Oedipal rivalry between father and son. 
 Unfortunately for Kris, when he offers this interpretation to his patient, the 
patient responds with his own coup de grace: in common with many patients who 
reveal the most important information as they are about to leave a session, as he is 
about to leave Kris’s smart New York apartment, the patient turns to his analyst and 
casually informs him: ‘Every noon, when I leave here, before luncheon, and before 
returning to my office, I walk through X street [a street well known for its small and 
attractive restaurants] and I look at the menus in the windows. In one of the 
restaurants I usually find my preferred dish – fresh brains.’22  
 What went wrong? Why did Kris’s interpretation backfire so spectacularly? 
The guy who thinks he is a plagiarist and does not have any ideas, any ‘fresh brains’ 
of his own, on being told by his analyst that he is not a plagiarist, that he does possess 
fresh brains of his own, leaves analysis and goes in search for fresh brains: in the 
flesh. Lacan has an answer and it is in line with the thesis I pose in this paper: if we 
imagine Public International Law as the patient in search of fresh brains that she 
imagines can be found in other disciplines, be they literature, politics, international 
relations, the last thing we should do is meet them in the register that Kris seems to be 
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so adept at entering: that is, in the domain of their own ego or what Lacan calls the 
imaginary. 
 What is wrong with meeting them at that level? From his paper on the mirror 
stage onwards Lacan never stopped reminding us that a patient’s own image of him or 
herself is fundamentally distorted: a mis-recognition
23
. Our precious identity is 
basically constructed from false identifications and copies of other people
24
. So if 
Public International Law is protesting that it is about justice or equity or reconciliation 
or revenge or forgiveness or catharsis or politics or the rule of law, the last thing the 
analyst should do is take Public International Law at her own word. To do that would 
mean the analyst would be reinforcing the patient’s mis-recognition of herself. If she 
does that then the patient, like Kris’s patient, will continue to act out and in years to 
come our children and grandchildren will still be analyzing and treating International 
Law, that is, if our patient has not, by then, committed suicide. 
 More dangerously, by entering the dimension of the patient’s imaginary in 
order to ‘cure’ the patient’s ego means in effect to normalize it while ignoring the 
dimension of desire: the dimension that is not normal or universalisable but is unique 
to each subject. It is to ignore the real question, that is, why the patient thinks he is a 
plagiarist. The dimension of what Lacan terms the Real, in other words, continues to 
remain unaddressed. What Lacan is worried about is that analysts address the 
patient’s ego in order to reshape their patients in accordance with the analyst’s 
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world
25
. Meanwhile the specificity and idiosyncrasy of the patient’s desire remains 
unaddressed; no wonder Lacan concludes by suggesting that, if anyone needs fresh 
brains, it is not Kris’s patient but the analyst Kris. 
 So what should the analyst have done? As far as the symbolic register is 
concerned for Lacan the answer is simple: there is no such thing as intellectual 
property. The symbolic belongs to everyone and therefore plagiarism doesn’t exist. 
Which enables Lacan to pose the real question: ‘if the symbolic belongs to 
everybody, why have things in the symbolic order taken on this emphasis, this weight, 
for the subject?’26 To address that question, it is not enough to tell the patient, ‘Don’t 
worry, you are not stealing’. You have to address why they are under the impression 
that they are stealing. To do that the analyst must penetrate to the Real, and in 
particular that bit of the Real that the patient is so ashamed of and embarrassed about 
that he has hidden even from himself. As I have related, Lacan coined a term for this: 
the extimate. To have a chance of penetrating to the extimate, the analyst should have 
preserved the patient’s hunger for eating fresh brains: had he done that, then the 
analyst might have found out why the patient was so hungry in the first place.  
 
                                                        
25
Lacan sees this as a wider plot by ego psychologists along the lines of Roosevelt’s New Deal in 
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to adopt to her social environment and to so-called reality. ‘Response to Jean Hyppolite’ in Ecrits, 
supra note 22, at 318-333. 
26
 Ibid, at 329. 
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5. From the Imaginary to the Real 
 
A bad analyst, as we have just seen, would behave like Kris:  if her patient 
were Public International Law, she would go and check if the work produced and 
performed by Public International Law is up to scratch; in doing that she would be 
entering the patient’s, no doubt distorted and self-reflecting imaginary. Such an 
excursion, according to Lacan, will do no good to anyone, least of all the patient. In 
entering the patient’s imaginary, the analyst would be assuming and implying that 
there is a standard against which Public International Law should compete and that 
standard, if not the analyst’s own, is one laid down by the Big Other of Law in 
general. So in addition to ‘normalizing’ the patient, another major flaw of the ego-
psychology treatment is its assumption that there is such a Big Other who is whole 
and complete, ignoring that the Big Other of the symbolic order is also irretrievably 
cut, castrated and lacking.  
 So how do we resist the temptation of meeting our patient at the level of her 
own imaginary (and no doubt imaginative) narratives (that it is about justice, 
reconciliation, politics, pragmatism, amongst other claims) and meet them at the level 
of the Real where an intervention will actually make a difference? The Lacanian 
insight which again is first and foremost Freudian, is that the analyst must listen to 
what the patient says about herself; in this instance the analyst must preserve the 
patient’s desire for fresh brains; by doing that the analyst will give the patient the 
opportunity to find out why she is so hungry in the first place. As I discuss shortly, my 
wager is that International Law is ravenous because it tries to fill a place that is 
unfilleable, that is, the empty place left by the death of God. 
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 So how does the analyst listen in such a way as to allow their patient to 
articulate their desire, uncontaminated by the analyst’s own desires and prejudices? 
The problem, as analysts find out daily when listening to their patients’ endless and 
monotonous ramblings, is that most of our speech about ourselves is idle chit chat; 
what Lacan called ‘empty speech’. Lacan goes further to insist that, for the analyst to 
respond to the subject’s ‘empty’ speech (that it is about justice, or reconciliation or 
forgiveness, or revenge), is to perpetuate the subject’s false identifications and mis-
recognitions. What the analyst must do is lead the subject to recognize the imaginary 
nature of those identifications. The Lacanian analyst will listen to International Law’s 
protests about itself, nod wisely and silently, and ignore them. The last thing she will 
do is take its monotonous and bombastic monologue about itself to be the truth. She 
will bear in mind that the demands International Law makes, its constant protests, 
may well be false demands, hiding its real desires. For it cannot be denied that at 
times International Law with its protests at its own idealism despite its poverty and 
weakness, takes the position of the beautiful soul who enjoys complaining about 
being sinned against and forgives and forgets her own sinning. And as Hegel pointed 
out qua this beautiful soul, the true evil is resides in the very gaze that sees evil all 
around itself
27
.  
 Rather than taking the patient at their word, the analyst will look beyond the 
patient’s empty speech to try hear their ‘full speech’. And what is full speech? In 
contrast to empty speech which maintains the distance between the I as speaker and I 
as subject of the message (the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the 
enunciated as linguists put it), full speech implicates the subject’s desire. And it will 
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come as no surprise that for Lacan that place is not far from the place where the 
subject’s enjoyment resides: truth, he says, is ‘the sister of that forbidden 
jouissance’28.  So full speech emerges when the subject comes to articulate their 
secret, shameful, and indeed hitherto only unconscious knowledge: that is, the 
extimate. This truth, hidden and excluded in the interior, we disavow in ourselves but, 
as we will see, are all too ready to find it in the other, in the neighbor. 
 
5. The Big Other: God 
 
A true analysis therefore will try to penetrate beyond the patient’s monotonous 
retellings of her own history and pierce through to her real yet inevitably repressed 
desires. It is at this, doubtless painful but real level, that we can hope to encounter 
Public International Law’s secret and disavowed kernel. This kernel, I suggest, is a 
passion to act as the limit that was once occupied by God.  
Kris’ patient’s insecurity and defenses against emulating someone ‘great’ take 
us back to the heart of psychoanalysis, the Oedipal struggle: Lacan had no issue with 
that aspect of Kris’s interpretation. Freud, as we know, revisits the Oedipal motif in 
his tangential analysis of the origins of law in Totem and Taboo. Supposedly based on 
his impressions of aboriginal Australians, Totem and Taboo reiterates the motif of the 
Oedipal struggle, insisting that we can learn from primitive societies, like from 
neurotics and children, what we repressed in our own psychic lives.  
One of the lessons we learn is that the son’s initial rivalry with his father and 
the son’s wish for the removal of the father becomes a desire for identification: the 
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son who wanted to replace the father now wants to be like the father. As Freud knew, 
however, there is nothing benign or flattering about identification: identification 
implies idealization but also competition with and annihilation of the other: 
‘Identification’ he writes, ‘is ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an 
expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone’s removal. It behaves 
like a derivative of the first, oral phase of the organization of the libido, in which the 
object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way 
annihilated as such.’29 
For Freud’s primal horde, the brothers’ love for the father becomes 
identification with the father followed by his annihilation, that is, his murder. Freud’s 
lesson however, as in Dostoevsky and Parricide, is that in the rivalry between father 
and son the son always loses: once you kill the father he becomes more powerful than 
before
30
. The sons inherit the guilt for their crime and the father becomes undead. As 
the Portuguese poet Jose Saramago puts it, ‘dead gods are gods forever’31. 
 This helps us answer the question Gilles Deleuze posed in an early essay on 
Nietzsche: quite simply and disarmingly Deleuze asks, ‘Did we kill God when we put 
man in his place and kept the most important thing, which is the place?’32 And the 
answer is the place is still very much present, indeed all the more glaringly and loudly 
present, for having been left spectacularly empty. Our modernist parents, we could 
say, wrecked the place by trying to kill God and we inherited their destruction: as I 
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have discussed before, the morning after the death of god is a nasty hangover. Our 
parents had the party and we are left with cleaning up the mess of their enjoyment
33
. 
 Psychoanalysis, furthermore, reminds us that it is not just the modernist house 
we inherited from our parents but every building that is cracked, the building housing 
each subject just as the building housing each system. The concept of God addressed, 
redressed and even repressed our desires for protection, for reassurance, and for 
belonging. For International Law whose founding fathers based its origins on divine 
law, God performed the functions of total legislation, total knowledge, total 
ownership (of territory) and of course total enjoyment. What is significant, moreover, 
is not how, or how well, God performed these functions, but the fact that the desires 
for someone who could perform these functions were there ab initio. And these 
desires were there ab initio precisely because every subject, and every system, is 
plagued by a lack at its center. The death of God may have revealed the emptiness at 
the heart of the symbolic order and at the heart of each subject more glaringly than 
ever before, but the death of God did not create the emptiness: the emptiness, to 
repeat the point, was there ab initio. Religion was one of the chief remedies, or 
placebos, imagined and created in response to this pre-existing emptiness.  
 As Lacan illustrated using Cantor’s set theory, the notion of a complete set, 
the set of all sets, does not exist as it is not possible to include the systematizing 
number within the system; if we exclude it, however, the system is inevitably 
incomplete
34
. The malady of incompleteness haunts not just set theory but everyone. 
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It is not just Lacan who insists on the impossibility of a set of all sets, the set that 
closes off the system. Hans Kelsen puts it more prosaically when he places Public 
International Law as the lynchpin of the grundnorm that crowns the pyramid of law-
making norms
35
.  The grundnorm, as we know, is a transcendental presupposition 
which does not exist but must be hypothesized for the rest of the system to work: just 
like every circle has a periphery, every system has a limit and this requirement does 
not escape International Law. The function of the limit is to give the illusion of 
completion, including the crucial ideological function of a ‘final’ limit: in the case of 
International Law we could say we postulate a limit, a grundnorm or Big Other to 
make up for the fact that everything underneath is not as cohesive and uniform as we 
would like it to be: to efface the fact, in other words, that there is no such thing as ‘an 
international society’. 
 Simpson in Law, War and Crime points out the undecideability of law’s 
‘place’, hovering uncertainly between domestic and international and leading 
Simpson to suggest that law’s ‘place’ is a ‘hybrid’36. I would go further and suggest 
that this place is not undecideable but empty. The barely disguised messianic 
messages and iconicity of the International Criminal Court, as Edwin Bikundo shows, 
betray the desperate attempt to fill the empty place with, if not God, at least 
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something ‘God-like’. International criminal trials in particular are suffused with 
liturgical rhetoric, apocalyptic warnings and promises of salvation; international 
criminal law therefore remains incurably ‘faith-based’.37 This is not surprising since 
modern theories of the state as Carl Schmitt knew, are so many secularized 
theological concepts
38
. Since belief is pivotal, we can understand the rush in 
International Criminal Law for the establishment of rituals and symbols more than 
doctrines. The use of secular law as if it were religious, and the role of sacrifice, as 
Bikundo has shown, are pivotal: in this case the sacrifice of the African whose peers 
form the preponderance of defendants in the International Criminal Court. While 
Simpson and Bikundo suggest that religious tropes are deployed to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice, my thesis goes slightly further: the gap, I maintain, is 
unfillable. 
 The limit as well as arrogance of modernity, however, is its refusal to 
acknowledge a limit. Moreover, the presumed absence of a limit makes the subject 
less rather than more free, more vulnerable, less confident. As Lacan responds to 
Dostoevsky, ‘Fat chance [the death of the father liberates us from the law]. The good 
news [that God is dead] does not liberate us from the law, far from it. If God is dead, 
nothing at all is permitted.’39 The alleged death of God, we could say, is responsible 
for Public International Law’s neurosis and its constant craving for fresh brains. If the 
rules and prohibitions making up Public International Law could be grounded in 
divine law, as in the doctrines of its founding fathers, then our patient might 
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occasionally be satiated. Instead, with modernity, our patient is at pains to ground 
fundamental and universal rules without the guarantee of an agreed limit. 
 In the following section I examine some presumed limits modernity tried to 
insert in the wake of the ‘death of God’ and in particular Kant’s exaltation of man as a 
legislative being whose will utters the categorical imperative. As will be obvious, 
psychoanalysts are far from convinced that Kant’s proposals for law in general or 
International Law in particular in his famous essay Towards Perpetual Peace succeed 
in establishing an impermeable limit; in the terms of this paper, what continues to 
‘leak through’, I argue, is the extimate. 
 
6. Can Law in General, and Public International Law in Particular, Act as a 
Limit?  
 
A. Freud and the Categorical Imperative: a Perverse Modern Taboo?  
 Modern man tried to imitate God’s injunction against proximity to the raw Real 
by inserting formal law in the empty place; in Kant’s case, this has taken the form of 
the categorical imperative. For Freud, however, the workings of the categorical 
imperative, in particular its compulsive nature, render it indistinguishable from the 
workings of taboos in pre-modern societies. For Freud the categorical imperative is a 
remnant of the primitive within modernity: ‘taboos still exist among us. Though 
expressed in a negative form and directed toward another subject-matter, they do not 
differ in their psychological nature from Kant’s “categorical imperative”, which 
operates in a compulsive fashion and rejects any conscious motives.’40 
                                                        
40
 Freud Totem and Taboo in The Standard Edition, supra note 12, Volume XIII (1913) at xiv.  
 26 
 For Freud law's origins are not unknowable, but unconscious; that is, our 
unconscious knows them, but our conscious selves strive to keep that knowledge well 
and truly repressed. And no wonder we choose to repress them, as those origins 
inevitably include an originary crime which has left us with the memory of guilt 
though not of the crime itself. Our guilt therefore, as Joan Copjec has put it, is all we 
know of the law and its origins
41
. In contrast to Kant, therefore, for Freud the only 
reason we have rules is not because we are rational but because we are guilty: and 
why are we guilty? Because we have already performed, or desired to perform that 
prohibited action, in our unconscious. ‘The basis of taboo’, as Freud puts it, 
disarmingly simply, ‘is a prohibited action, for performing which a strong inclination 
exists in the unconscious.’42  
Which leads us to articulate Freud’s obvious, yet neglected insight on the 
relationship between law and desire: ‘where there is a prohibition there must be an 
underlying desire’ he insists43. And it is because these desires are so strong that ‘the 
most severe measures of defense’ against them are needed44. Taboos, categorical 
imperatives, moral and conventional prohibitions, all share the same origin and that is 
none other than desire. The origin of law, we can say clearly, is desire. For 
psychoanalysis the proscriptions of International Law, like of all law, are precisely 
based on desire. Public International Law, like all law, prohibits what is most desired:  
if there were no desire then there would be no need for prohibition.  
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 Since the origin of law is desire, the function of Law, as Lacan insisted, is not 
to prevent access to our desires but to act as a defense against unlimited desire and 
thereby unbearable enjoyment. Access to unbridled enjoyment would be unbearable 
for the subject so law acts as a limit, not to our freedom, but to limitless, and therefore 
unbearable, enjoyment. Law’s limit on enjoyment is reassuring because it makes it 
look like what we cannot attain due to our inherent lack is instead prohibited. So in 
the case of International Law, small or weak states can usefully claim ‘we don’t attack 
or invade other states, not because we can’t, but because it is prohibited’.  
 
B. Self-Legislation as a Limit? 
Can self-legislation perform the function of the limit? For Kant what is right 
and what is wrong, what ought I to do, can be decided by reason only. At the same 
time, Kant appreciated that ‘pure reason’ left a ‘vacant place’ in its account of the 
world and set out to fill it with his account of ‘practical’ or ‘moral’ reason45. What 
does practical reason demand? For Kant pure practical reason enjoins the subject to 
act in such a way as she would will for her action to be a universal law. The resulting 
moral duty, therefore, is not imposed on the subject but autonomously assumed by the 
subject herself: the individual acting in accordance with the moral law identifies her 
will with the principle behind the law so the moral law is not dictated but self-posited. 
 For Kant, therefore, self-legislation is expected to function as the indispensable 
limit of the system. Yet is self-legislation, whether in domestic or international law, 
possible or even desirable? For Kant law is paramount because he sees man as a 
legislative being; International Law seems especially appealing and in line with 
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Kant’s principles because it is based on the ideal of self-legislation and consent. 
While in domestic law, the concept of self-governance has become a long-lost ideal 
and distant memory, with self-governance meaning, at best, governance by the 
majority or the representatives who may or may not represent the ‘self’, in Public 
International Law this ideal is supposedly still alive: Public International Law’s main 
sources being the customary practice of states and the obligations they voluntarily 
entered into through treaties, suggest that the state’s will is still paramount.   
 In the case of the individual, self-rule is not necessarily universally welcome, 
nor is everyone convinced by Kant’s celebration of the ‘dignity’ of the free will. 
France’s Michel Houellebecq doesn’t take long to dismiss Kant’s pretensions: 
‘According to Immanuel Kant’, he muses ‘human dignity consists in not accepting to 
be subject to laws except inasmuch as one can simultaneously consider oneself a 
legislator. Never had such a bizarre fantasy entered my mind. I was quite happy to 
delegate whatever powers I had’46. The inverse of us creating our own duties is the 
injunction to, not only perform that duty, but to choose what duty we have to perform 
and take responsibility for its consequences. Such a duty, the duty to choose one’s 
duty, and to further choose the correct duty, far from liberating the modern subject, 
weighs on her with the tyranny of responsibility; what if I make the wrong choice? No 
wonder we are often left hoping that someone or something would please choose for 
us. Exercising free will and choosing one’s duty, a duty that one would will, at the 
same time, to be a universal law, and then acting in accordance with that duty is no 
easy task. No wonder we often watch states reacting or colluding in other states’ 
desires. In psychoanalytic terms, like hysterical patients, states, rather than choosing 
or determining their own will, often copy or imitate the will of other states: in 
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particular of a powerful state. How often do we witness countries like the United 
Kingdom for example appear to let the United States choose their desire for them?
47
  
 Like Freud, Kant agrees that in the absence of international institutions, states 
live in a state of nature, that is, in a state of war with each other: ‘nations engaged in a 
war’ he writes, ‘are like two drunkards bludgeoning each other in a china shop’48. Yet 
his hope that reason could be the foundation for the moral law extended to 
international law in his famous Perpetual Peace. The attempt again is to ground peace 
between nations not on the existence of God but on reason and the rule of law. In 
modernist international law as conceived by Kant the principle of sovereignty and 
sovereign equality means that states are only bound by norms they have themselves 
agreed on. If the ideals of the rule of law and self-legislation work in domestic law, 
then, Kant insists, they will do so ‘even in a race of devils’. Self-legislation, then, is 
the transcendental norm with the sovereign state taking the place of Kant’s self-
legislating individual in the international legal order.  
 Kant’s set of ‘preliminary articles’ for reducing the likelihood of war include 
the prohibition of annexation of one state by another, the abolition of standing armies, 
and a ban on interference by one state in the internal affairs of another
49
.  In addition 
his ‘definitive articles’ include the insistence that every state shall have a republican 
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civil constitution so it is the people decide who whether there will be a war
50
. Rulers 
who wage war without their people’s consent are using their subjects as property, as a 
means rather than an end in themselves: ‘Citizens must give their free assent, through 
their representatives, not only to waging war in general but to each particular 
declaration of war’51.  
 Kant, while conscious of the fact that individuals as well as states are not 
angels but a race of devils looking out for their own self-interest, still insists that that 
minor inconvenience can be catered for ‘if only they are intelligent’. A big if as it 
turns out. For Kant what underlines it all is not altruism but self-interest: When states 
are ruled in accordance with the wishes of the people, their self-interest will provide a 
consistent basis for pacific relations:  
The problem of organizing a state however hard it may seem, can be solved 
even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent. The problem is: “Given a 
multitude of rational beings requiring universal laws for their preservation, but 
each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a 
constitution in such a way that, although their private intentions conflict, they 
check each other, with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they 
had no such intentions.
52
 
The bad man, the ‘devil’ for Kant, as Hannah Arendt emphasized in her Lectures on 
Kant’s Political Philosophy, is someone who is inclined to secretly exempt himself 
from the rule. The point here is ‘secretly’ because for Kant, ‘In politics, as 
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distinguished from morals, everything depends on public conduct.’ 53  Publicity 
therefore is key to Kant’s political thinking and, we trust, to Public International Law. 
The trust is that evil deeds can only done in secret. As Hannah Arendt summarizes, 
‘Publicness’ is a criterion in his moral philosophy.. Morality is the coincidence 
between the public and the private. To be evil is to withdraw from the public realm. 
Morality means being fit to be seen’ and ‘Publicness is the transcendental principle 
that should rule all action.’54 
 Lest we think that Kant’s ideal of a rule of law ruling the nations was always 
naïve and certainly by now outdated, we only need to look at contemporary debates to 
find for instance Jean L. Cohen’s renewed ‘plea for a re-articulation of Public 
International Law along the lines of the rule of law’55. Cohen sets out to update 
international law by asking for a renewed ‘strengthening of supranational institutions, 
formal legal reform, and the creation of a global rule of law that protects both the 
sovereign equality of states based on a revised conception of sovereignty and human 
rights’. She acknowledges, of course, that ‘international law can also be 
instrumentalized by the powerful. But the principle of sovereign equality and its 
correlate, nonintervention, provides a powerful normative presumption against 
unwarranted aggression. Abandoning it’, she concludes, ‘would be a mistake’56. Once 
again we see a focus on administration and impersonal rules to eliminate the political; 
can such rules and administration however, eliminate the extimate? 
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 A few serious problems immediately present themselves however: first, 
despite Kant’s optimism, not all people are necessarily intelligent, even when it 
comes to their own self-interest. Second, unfortunately people are willing to commit 
evil deeds publicly. Thirdly, if self-legislation is a distant memory in the domestic 
sphere where private individuals hardly get to choose the laws they are governed by, 
does it have any meaning in the international arena? In the case of Public 
International Law, and self-legislation by states, what does the freedom to create 
one’s own laws actually entail in the twenty-first century? Are states free to choose 
any and all types of laws? Not surprisingly, we find that it is only ‘some’ systems and 
‘some’ states that enjoy this freedom to choose. It is obviously forbidden not to be a 
democrat: indeed it is taboo to question the desirability or self-evident goodness of 
democracy.  
As Slavoj Zizek and Alain Badiou have been pointing out, the only choice we 
are told we have today is between liberal democracy and fundamentalism
57
. Political 
freedom in the twentieth first century, rather than the grand ideal of self-legislation 
dreamed of by the Enlightenment is reduced to the freedom to choose a particular 
lifestyle, indeed only one lifestyle: global capitalism. Yet it is obvious that democracy 
is not open at the fundamental level of the economy: as Zizek points out simply, 
International Monetary Fund chiefs are not elected by the billions of people whose 
decisions they affect. Global capitalism in effect excludes democracy at a structural 
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level, and therefore appeals to neo-Kantianism risk appearing as a form of state 
philosophy: as propaganda, in other words, for neo-liberalism
58
. 
 
C. Lacan On Kant: The Perverse Core of Kant  
 As if such an attack on Kant’s dignity of the free will was not severe enough, 
Freud’s blow to Kantian ethics continues by suggesting that what Kant calls the moral 
law, the inner voice of conscience which utters the categorical imperative, is nothing 
other than the superego. Rather than issuing guidance and benign rebukes to the 
subject, Lacan’s superego is a sadistic agency whose origins hark back to the perverse 
God who commands Abraham to kill his own son. This superego not only enjoins the 
subject to obey the moral law but also enjoys the subject’s failures to come up to its 
exacting standards.  
 Lacan takes this cue from Freud and pushes the point further: the core of 
Kantian ethics, he suggests, as a demand for the impossible (‘You can because you 
must’) has a perverse undercurrent, just as Sade’s perverse discourse can be construed 
to have an ethical undercurrent: using the other as an instrument for my enjoyment 
implies, indeed demands, a correlative right in the other to use me as an instrument 
for his or her enjoyment. So for Lacan the Marquis de Sade’s ‘will-to-jouissance’ 
conformed perfectly to Kant’s imperative of the universalization of the will: Sade’s 
will to use others as instruments for his enjoyment recognized at the same time the 
right of others to use him as an instrument for their enjoyment. In short, a subject can 
derive enjoyment from enunciating and imposing categorical imperatives, commands 
which may be well universalisable as Kant insisted, but are not necessarily for good 
ends.  
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 The ‘emptiness’ of the moral law, the fact that it doesn’t enunciate any notion of 
the Good other than doing one’s duty, can lead the subject to do something not only 
for the sake of duty but only for the sake of duty. That is, one can conform to the 
formal structure of the categorical imperative irrespective of the substantive content 
of that imperative, in other words, while pursuing diabolically evil ends. A famous 
abuse of Kantian ethics was of course Eichmann’s appeal to Kant during his trial in 
Jerusalem: Eichmann’s perversion, as Hannah Arendt and others have described, 
involved putting himself in the position of an instrument of the Big Other’s — here 
the Furher’s — will. By making himself the instrument of the Big Other’s will, a 
subject like Eichmann can use the notion of duty as an excuse to absolve himself from 
exercising free will and for refusing to acknowledge that he did, indeed have a choice. 
As Alenka Župancic puts it, ‘what is most dangerous is not an insignificant bureaucrat 
who thinks he is God but, rather, the God who pretends to be an insignificant 
bureaucrat. One could even say that, for the subject, the most difficult thing is to 
accept that, in a certain sense, she is “God”, that she has a choice’59. The horror 
Eichmann’s case revealed, as Zizek notes, is that in modernity evil is not just pure 
egotistical evil, that is, for simple selfish reasons, but radical evil: ‘Evil masked 
(appearing) as universality’.60  
 Public International Law’s retreat, therefore, behind rules, procedure, 
diplomacy and bureaucracy will not save us from having to make an ethical choice. 
The reason why rules and self-legislation are not adequate for protecting us from 
radical evil is the same in the case of individuals as it is for a group of individuals 
called states: Public International Law, no more than any law, can not escape the 
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pathological. The symbolic, to put it in lacanese, is not a sufficient barrier against the 
Real. 
 Kant was aware of this, showing not only the limits of pure reason and 
supplementing it with practical or moral reason, but also revealing the excess in 
humanity; he appreciated, in his words, the ‘scandal of reason’, that ‘reason 
contradicts itself’61.  The capacity for the infinite of practical reason is also a capacity 
for the inhuman, for radical evil. As we see later, this inhuman element, the undead as 
Zizek calls it, is the excessive dimension of the human.  While with the creation of the 
modern state this irrational excess is supposed to have been left out, like a state within 
a state, to return to Freud’s metaphor, like the repressed, it is always bound to return 
and shatter the patient’s equanimity.  
 
8. Humanity or a Race of Devils? 
 
If formal law cannot be guaranteed to protect us from the pathological, what 
about the cult of humanity, otherwise known as Human Rights? If divine law 
prompted and promoted faith in a tradition of natural law, following the death of God 
the cult of humanity provided a tradition of natural rights as human rights. Kant 
frequently cites Leviticus’ injunction to love one’s neighbor as yourself as an instance 
of the categorical imperative and continues the logic of universalization and marriage 
between religion and reason.  
 Psychoanalysts, however, are not convinced. For Freud in his pessimistic late 
work Civilization and Its Discontents, the injunction to love one’s neighbour is 
Christianity’s ultimate delusion: ‘not merely is this stranger not worthy of my love’, 
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he protests. ‘I must honestly confess that he has more claim to my hostility and even 
my hatred’62. Freud appreciated that solidarity within the community is only ever 
achieved at the expense of those outside the group; in that sense, Jews, he presciently 
claimed, rendered ‘most useful services’ by being the target of hatred and thus 
promoting community spirit among Christians
63
. The rise of nationalism and 
fundamentalism in the last two decades suggests that tolerance and multiculturalism 
have not worked. And that closer co-existence can breed, not more respect and 
cooperation but more intolerance and hostility.  
 The message of the second half of the twentieth century, a time when human 
rights were enacted and sought to be enforced is, unfortunately, not as salient as we 
would like: the neighbor, it appears, is only tolerated, respected and celebrated when 
she is kept at a proper distance.
64
 When she comes too close, as the plight of refugees 
and illegal immigrants betrays only too well, the rhetoric of toleration shows its 
limits. Freud and Lacan shared this pessimistic analysis of the limits of human 
generosity and neighborly love: altruism, as Lacan pointed out, does not cost much, 
and indeed it protects, rather than detracts from our egoism, since we only help those 
who are in our own image. It seems that the other whom we do not recognize as being 
in our own image, is left to the wiles not of our humanity, but of a God that we 
profess to have killed.  
 For psychoanalysis the function of law is not to bring us close to the neighbor, 
but to keep him at a proper distance: that is, the underlying focus of the law is not to 
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enjoin us to ‘care’ for our neighbor but to regulate the relationship between us so that 
the neighbor doesn’t get too close to us. For Freud in Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego distributive justice only works because we deny ourselves things 
so that others may be deprived of them as well
65
. We could go further and say, like 
Zizek, that the charade of political correctness and celebration of multi-culturalism 
arise not from love of one’s neighbor but from fear of encountering real others; the 
fear of the inevitable violence such encounters entail. Which leads to my conclusion: 
 
9. The Extimate Is The Neighbor 
 
If the extimate is the bit in ourselves that we don’t dare approach, the 
unassimilable core, or, as Lacan often described it, the Thing, the un-decaffeinated 
neighbor exemplifies this radical core. ‘Freud’, Lacan understands, ‘recoils in horror 
at the commandment to love one’s neighbor because of the evil that dwells in the 
neighbor and therefore also in oneself. And what is it that we don’t dare go near to? 
Our jouissance – that which prevents us from crossing a frontier at the limit of the 
Thing’.66 The alien, traumatic kernel, the unbearable Thing we don’t dare approach, 
except from the safe distance of decaffeinated tolerance and multiculturalism, is the 
neighbor. The neighbor who has not had the caffeine subtracted from her is the 
neighbor we don’t dare approach and find it harder to love.  
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 As Jacques Alain Miller discusses, the concept of the neighbor in Christianity 
seeks to abolish extimacy: as if such a project were ever possible. ‘The Christian 
injunction’ Jacques Alain Miller says is ‘nullify extimacy’67. Lawyers and human 
rights lawyers in particular are used to addressing the symbolic register, the register 
where one subject can superficially look like another. However, what law and the 
symbolic order generally cannot get rid of is the extimate. Human rights discourse 
may try to reduce the disturbing and unassimilable core of the other to what is 
common, to the universal, to what conforms to the norm. As Miller puts it, ‘On the 
level of the signifier, on the level of form, there is equality, substitutability, peace’. 
But what makes the other other, their alterity, their difference, their particularity, is 
not on the level of the signifier, of the symbolic, but on the level of the Real, of the 
extimate. At that level, the other is irreducibly different: at that level, as Miller says, 
‘there is war.’68 
 Miller suggests why none of the generous and universal discourses on the 
theme of ‘we are all fellow-beings’ have been effective. Because racism, he 
continues,  
calls into play a hatred which goes precisely toward what grounds the Other’s 
alterity, in other words its jouissance. If no decision, no will, no amount of 
reasoning is sufficient to wipe out racism, it is because racism is founded on 
the point of extimacy of the Other. Racism is founded on what one imagines 
about the Other’s jouissance; it is hatred of the particular way, of the Other’s 
own way of experiencing jouissance. We may well think that racism exists 
because our Islamic neighbor is too noisy when he has parties; nevertheless it 
is a fact that what is really at stake is that he takes his jouissance in a way 
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different from ours. The Other’s proximity exacerbates racism: as soon as 
there is closeness, there is a confrontation of incompatible modes of 
jouissance. For it is simple to love one’s neighbor when he is distant, but it is 
a different matter in proximity. Racist stories are always about the way in 
which the Other obtains a plus-de-jouir: either he does not work enough or he 
works too much, or he is useless or a little too useful, but whatever the case 
may be, he is always endowed with a part of jouissance that he does not 
deserve.  
Intolerance, in short, is intolerance of the other’s enjoyment. We can now make sense 
of Kierkeegaard’s dramatic claim, often repeated by Zizek, that the only good 
neighbor is a dead neighbor
69. If the extimate is the neighbor’s disturbing jouissance 
then Kierkeegaard is right that the only good neighbor is a dead neighbor: because a 
dead body can no longer enjoy.  
 
10. Towards An Atheist Public International Law 
 
To sum, Public International Law, I have suggested, is an inadequate, or 
porous limit because, like all law, it does not take account of the extimate: it can 
neither guard against the extimate in the other nor acknowledge the extimate in 
ourselves. Can we learn anything from Kris’s failure in the fresh brains case to 
address this deadlock? As we recall, Kris wanted to show his patient that he was 
plagued by a desire to consume fresh brains because he believed in the existence of 
someone who already possessed fresh brains: that is, someone who is Great, someone 
who knows everything. As I discussed, this belief in someone who knows it all harks 
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back not only to the ‘grand-father’ of the patient but to the grand-father par 
excellence, the omniscient divinity. Public International Law suffers from a similar 
symptom; that there is someone out there greater than it, that it compares itself to and 
finds itself wanting.  
As I have discussed, the entity which the subject directs her demands to, 
imagining that they have the capacity to answer and fulfill them is not a subject but a 
place: the place where full knowledge and full enjoyment is not only possible but 
attainable. In other words,  the place once occupied by God. Learning from Kris’s 
mistake, the task for the analyst I suggest is not to tell the patient, ‘listen, don’t worry, 
you are also great’ but instead lead them to come to terms with the fact that the person 
they have been trying to please, impress, and imitate is also not great. That the place 
she has been addressing her demands and beliefs to is an empty place. 
 I call this realization, the traversing of the fundamental fantasy of someone 
great the atheist position: fully assuming the non-existence of a Big Other who knows 
it all means learning to know how not to know and continuing without guarantees. 
Like the man in search of fresh brains, like International Law, like all of us, we must 
acknowledge not only that we don’t know but that the Other doesn’t know either. 
That the answers are not to be found in other disciplines, or in other people’s brains, 
but in our own disavowed, repressed, and hidden extimate recesses.  
This, of course, is no easy task: it means facing up to our own ugliness without 
the help of consoling fantasies including the fantasy of a God, or a Big Other, or 
ideologies including Human Rights or Democracy. It means confronting our own 
excess jouissance, an enjoyment that we find so threatening when we encounter it in 
the neighbor precisely because it is the unacknowledged evil that also resides in 
ourselves. Moreover, we must confront this ‘radical evil’, to borrow Kant’s 
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expression, without the placebos and palliative softeners provided by fantasies of a 
benign humanity or a benevolent Big Other. Like Kris’s patient, we need to recognize 
there is no grand pere who knows it all, that when we come face to face with the 
extimate we are alone; and that no law, international or domestic, can protect us. This 
is the foremost ethical demand facing International Law today and the challenge we 
must rise to: until we are ready to confront our own extimate core, no individual or 
social transformation can take place  
Freud’s response to Kant’s Perpetual Peace can be found I suggest in his 
pessimistic late work, Civilization and Its Discontents. Anticipating Lacan, who was, 
after all, Freudian first and foremost, Freud suggests here that what eros and 
civilization can ultimately never eradicate, however hard they try, is the death drive 
or, in our terms, the extimate: 
The inclination to aggression is an original, self-instinctual disposition in man, 
and it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization… man’s natural 
aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and of all against each, 
opposes this program of civilization. The aggressive instinct is the derivative 
and the main representative of the death instinct which we have found 
alongside of Eros and which shares world-dominion with it. 
70
 
For Freud the death drive, whether it exists or not, it nevertheless persists and insists. 
Like the undead, it is defiant, intransigent, obstinate, unassimilable, unriddable. and 
above all, unlegislateable. Following Zizek’s term, we can call it the ‘indivisible 
remainder’ that persists beyond and oblivious to symbolic and imaginary appeals, 
rules, and interventions
71
.  
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 Public International Law, like all of us, continue to refuse to acknowledge the 
extimate: that there are things we cannot represent, not by law and not by literature 
either. The extimate, nevertheless, what is closest to us than ourselves, continues to 
persist and insist. It is no wonder therefore that Schopenhauer’s verdict on Kant was 
that, despite protesting to be exploring and critiquing the nature of reason, he was, all 
along, courting religion: as Schopenhauer memorably suggested, Kant was like the 
man at a masked ball trying to seduce a woman only to find when she removed her 
mask that the masked lady was his wife all along. Kant, in other words, was at pains 
to seduce reason but behind the mask of reason was always religion
72
.  
 To return to my beginning: to get to the extimate we must experience anxiety. 
Unlike other affects that we can fool ourselves into thinking we feel, anxiety doesn’t 
lie: it is the alarm bell that announces to us that we are approaching the extimate. 
When we experience anxiety we know we are touching the untouchable, 
unassimilable core. When and how does this happen? In the terms I have been using 
in this paper, and which Lacan insisted on when demolishing Kris’s attempt at 
treatment, this happens when the extimate is not safely hidden by law (the symbolic), 
or by politics (the imaginary), or by affects or passions (that can be faked) but erupts 
in all its obscene and violent underside. I will close with two examples of such recent 
explosions of the extimate, both causing anxiety and forcing us to confront the 
extimate, the first in the neighbor, the second in ourselves. 
 First, France’s recent legislation banning the burka or niqab in public; when 
the other’s difference, her extimacy, is all too apparent, the rhetoric of toleration, 
allowance and acceptance come abruptly to an end. As Slavoj Zizek elaborates this 
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example, when the face which subjectivizes the neighbor and makes her look a little 
like us is hidden from view, we are confronted with the horror of the neighbor as 
unbearable thing and the `tolerant’ west from France and beyond can no longer 
pretend to tolerate it
73
. The French legislators, we could say, prefer their neighbor 
‘decaffeinated’.  
My second example is an instance when the extimate is shown not in the 
other, in the neighbor, but in ourselves: the abuses at Abu Ghraib which as we know 
are not isolated instances of lone rangers or ‘bad apples’ but all-too endemic in the 
conduct of wars and indeed in the exercise of power generally. As Zizek elaborates 
again, Abu Ghraib illustrates ‘the disavowed beliefs, suppositions, and obscene 
practices that we pretend not to know about even though they form the background of 
our public values.’74  
In international just as in domestic law and institutions, the abuse of power 
forms the obscene and hidden underside of all exercise of power. I have called this 
hidden and obscene core the extimate, the gap in the subject as well as in the Other 
that God was so good at concealing. In the morning after the death of God, fully 
assuming this gap at the center of our subjectivity as well as of our neighbor, in all its 
ugliness, and without decaffeinating it, is the highest and hardest ethical demand 
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International Law, and all of us, face. Until we do that, no amount of ‘fresh brains’ 
will be sufficient to satiate our patient.  
